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I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, I shall discuss what I consider to be the significant
changes in family law during the past twenty-five years, and areas
in which I believe continued change is likely to occur. Then I shall
describe each element of change in more detail.
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.S., J.D., LL.M., Univer-
sity of Illinois.
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While some may dispute it, I think that family law tends to fol-
low, rather than lead, social upheaval and adjustment in family de-
cisions and structures. For example, the no-fault revolution in
divorce law was a response to the rising rate of divorce, not a cause
of the phenomenon. In my opinion, the most important legal
changes are a direct result of a massive shift in our social, political,
and economic constructs in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
Family law has been transformed in three notable ways since
1968. First, family law has incorporated the concept of serial mar-
riage (or of marriage that is likely to result in divorce) into the
rules governing intact marriage relationships as well as divorce,
custody, child support, alimony and property division. Second,
family law has become more uniform throughout the United
States. This uniformity is partially due to the enactment of federal
statutes that affect state law, and to the universal adoption of cer-
tain uniform acts. Both types of laws frequently deal with parent-
child issues such as custody and child support. Third, family law
issues have frequently been the focus of United States Supreme
Court constitutional law cases. Many ordinary family law
problems have been elevated to the status of fundamental ques-
tions about personal rights.
While the above trends are likely to continue, I think three other
developments will be critical in the evolution of family law. One
development is the expansion of the concept of what constitutes a
"family" in the modern context. Another development is the treat-
ment of children as autonomous individuals, separate and distinct
from their parents in the legal sense of family. The third develop-
ment is the revolution in reproductive technology. Each of these
trends will have a significant impact on the family law of the future.
II. CHANGES IN THE LAST TwENTY-FIVE YEARS
A. Marriage as a Transient, Rather than Permanent, State
Approximately half of all marriages entered into during the past
twenty-five years will end in divorce.' While it is true that the di-
vorce rate has increased dramatically in the recent past, it had been
1. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 195-97 (2d ed. 1991).
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increasing steadily since the Civil War.2 The reasons for this phe-
nomenon are unclear, but possible explanations abound. For ex-
ample, people live longer. Life expectancy has increased
significantly, even since the turn of the century.' In earlier times,
most spouses would not both survive into middle age. Also, at
some point, couples in the United States ceased to marry solely for
economic security or social status and began to marry for love,
companionship, and personal fulfillment. This practice changed
the parties' expectations of the marital relationship. In more re-
cent years, social changes such as the women's movement, as well
as the technological development of the birth-control pill, have en-
abled women to become better educated, to participate more fully
and at higher levels in the work force, to delay childbearing, and to
have smaller families. These opportunities gave women (and, to a
lesser extent, men) the financial and emotional ability to leave a
marriage when it became unsatisfactory. To be a divorced person,
to remarry (most people who divorce eventually remarry), or to be
a part of a blended family (formerly step-family) also became more
socially acceptable.4
1. Prenuptial Agreements
One legal development concerns the parties' agreements before
marriage. Twenty-five years ago, courts were reluctant to recog-
nize prenuptial agreements. "Looking to" divorce at the time of
marriage, at least in such a direct fashion, was against public pol-
icy.5 Today, however, most states willingly recognize premarital
2. ANDREW CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 21-27 (1981). The di-
vorce rate, however, seemed to hit a level point or even decrease slightly at the end of the
1980s. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 195-97 (2d ed. 1991).
3. See, e.g., Barbara B. Torrey & W. Ward Kingkade, Population Dynamics of the
United States and the Soviet Union, 247 SCIENCE 1548, 1554 (1990) (discussing life expec-
tancy rates).
4. The following sources address the changing societal stereotypes associated with di-
vorces: MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW (1989); MARY A.
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1985); ARLENE SKOLNICK, EM-
BA'FLED PARADISE (1991); LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985);
Margaret Clelk & T. Allan Pearson, Perceived Causes of Divorce, An Analysis of Interrela-
tionships, 47 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 179 (1985); Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes To-
wards Separation and Divorce: Causes and Consequences, 90 AM. J. OF Soc. 856 (1985).
5. See HOMER CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1.9 (1968) (discussing early
views on premarital agreements).
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agreements if certain safeguards are present.6 Typically, the agree-
ment must be in writing, the parties must fully disclose their finan-
cial situations, and unfair pressure must not be applied to either
party.
2. Family Violence7
While the law historically has taken a "hands-off" approach to
dealing with party disagreements of the intact marriage, one dra-
matic change has taken place in the area of family violence. Much
psychological and sociological research was conducted in the 1960s
and the 1970s on the subject of spousal abuse. Thus, the legal sys-
tem began to recognize the need to deal more effectively with the
problem. States instituted educational programs for police officers,
judges, prosecutors, and others involved in the legal aspects of bat-
tering. Statutes were enacted, giving the victims of family violence
greater and more efficient protection from their abusers.8 State
courts began to recognize the existence of the "battered woman
syndrome" as a defense or a mitigating circumstance in certain
murder or manslaughter cases.9 Even more interesting is the shift
6. See HOMER CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1988) (noting abundance
of prenuptial agreements); see also UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A.
369 (1987, 1993 Supp.) (listing requirements for premarital agreements); J. Thomas Old-
ham, Premarital Contracts Are Now Enforceable, Unless .... 21 Hous. L. REV. 757, 763
(1984) (addressing enforceability of prenuptial agreements).
7. Many authors have addressed the issue of family violence. E.g., DAVID FINKELHOE
ET AL., THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES (1983); RICHARD GELLES & MURRAY STRAUS,
INTIMATE VIOLENCE (1988); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976); ERIN PIZZEY,
SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1977); MARIA Roy, THE ABUSIVE
PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING (1982); SUSAN SCHECrER, WOMEN
AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982); MURRAY STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS,
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1984); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); Katherine Waits,
The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging
the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267 (1985); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet:
The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV.
545 (1988).
8. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN., §§ 71.01-.19 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993) (giving
Texas statutory provisions for protective orders).
9. A number of books and articles address the modem recognition of the "battered
woman syndrome." E.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987);
CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF DEFENSE AS
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE (1989); LE-
NORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE (1st ed., 1989); Victoria M. Mather, A Scary Tale: Bat-
tered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601 (1992); Victoria M.
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in the rape laws of many states that now permit, under certain cir-
cumstances, a husband to be prosecuted for the rape of his wife. 1"
Both of these developments are partially the result of the recogni-
tion that marriage is not a permanent institution, that parties to
marriage are separate individuals, and that a wife is not the "prop-
erty" of her husband.
3. No-fault Divorce"
This awareness of the serial nature of modern marriage is re-
flected in some other changes in divorce law. First, all states have
incorporated some form of no-fault grounds into the divorce laws.
In some states, no-fault grounds are the only possible grounds. No-
fault grounds were intended to reduce acrimony between the par-
ties, because no blame was to be assigned for the breakdown of the
marriage. The no-fault model was also thought to be a more realis-
tic legal construct for the dissolution of the marital relationship and
less conducive to manufactured or perjured "grounds" for divorce.
The striking thing about no-fault divorce is that it made possible
a unilateral decision to dissolve the marriage. Before the advent of
no-fault, a party to the marriage had to do something "wrong"
(e.g., mental cruelty, physical cruelty, or adultery), and the party
filing for divorce had to be without fault before a divorce could be
granted. A radical conceptual shift occurred from a blame-based,
Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and
Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545 (1988).
10. See Sonya A. Adamo, Note, The Injustice of the Marital Rape Exemption: A Sur-
vey of Common Law Countries, 4 AM. U. J. IIrr'L L. & POL'Y 555, 559 (1989) (discussing
laws acknowledging marital rape); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemp-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1986) (addressing
emergence of marital rape laws). The states have taken a variety of approaches in this
area. Some states have abolished the exemption, and others have limited it to cases in
which the parties are separated or divorce proceedings are underway. Some states provide
for a qualified exemption; for example, sexual assault prosecution is possible, but a married
woman must show bodily harm or threat of bodily harm. E.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.011(g) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Finally, some states still preserve the exemption. See
generally Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1985) (finding no exception exempting
spousal rape); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (1984) (disallowing marital-rape
exemption).
11. The effects of modern no-fault divorce laws have been revolutionary, as noted by
several commentators. E.g., JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW 340-44 (3d ed. 1992); MARY A.
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 188-96 (1989); LENORE WEITZMANN,
Tim DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); Lawrence M. Freedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce
Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 654 (1984).
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guilt-and-innocence idea of divorce to a system that granted a di-
vorce simply because one party to the marriage thought it was a
good idea. No-fault undoubtedly makes it "easier" to get divorced.
Also, no-fault divorce reflects the social and political realities of
the serial nature of many modern marriages.
No-fault divorce has been criticized roundly in recent years.12
The argument is that the no-fault revolution in divorce law has hurt
women and children, mainly in the economic sense. Many studies
show that women and children are significantly less well-off than
men after a divorce, as mothers today are still normally awarded
custody of their children.13 Some authorities contend that no-fault
makes it too easy to get a divorce. Also, courts now attempt to
avoid placing blame or punishing a spouse who is at "fault." Nev-
ertheless, no-fault divorce clearly seems to be here to stay. The
problem of the postdivorce economic situation of women and chil-
dren needs to be dealt with in other ways.
4. Division of Marital Property at Divorce
Another trend in divorce law acknowledging the indefinite dura-
tion of marriage is the recognition of both spouses' contributions to
the assets accumulated during the marriage. Not long ago, in a
noncommunity property state, each spouse owned property that
was labeled with his or her name. At divorce, each spouse was
awarded the property titled in his or her name. In modern law,
courts tend to use an equitable distribution approach, which may
be required by statute as well, to divide property equitably be-
12. See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 21 (1991) (discussing no-fault divorce's negative effects on
women). Other sources also discuss problems associated with no-fault divorce. E.g., Rich-
ard Inglesby, Matrimonial Breakdown and the Legal Process: The Limitations of No-Fault
Divorce, 11 LAW & POL'Y 1, 3 (1989); Herma Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective
on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1987); Cynthia Starnes, Di-
vorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 76 (1993).
13. See LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 337-43 (1985) (discussing
statistical studies on the economic effects of divorce). Weitzman in The Divorce Revolu-
tion found that men in her study experienced a 42% increase in their standard of living
while women suffered a 73% decrease. Id. Other studies find a smaller decline in living
standards for women. See, e.g., Robert S. Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on
Income and Consumption in Single-Parent Households, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 115
(1984) (noting financial problems faced by single parents after divorce).
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tween both parties, regardless of the ownership label.' 4 The equi-
table distribution rule is also common in community property
states. Community property law vests equal ownership in property
acquired during the marriage to both husband and wife. When eq-
uitable distribution is applied at divorce, courts may award unequal
shares of community property to the spouses.
Courts are also experimenting with attempts to divide intangible
assets. Studies show that most marriages end within the first nine
years of married life.'5 Most couples have not accumulated sub-
stantial material assets at that stage of their lives. In fact, the in-
creased earning capacity of one or both partners (through
education and experience) is often the major marital asset. As a
result, today, unlike twenty-five years ago, courts hold that pen-
sions should be included in the division of marital assets.' 6 Also,
courts have struggled with the divisibility of professional degrees,
professional licenses, and the goodwill of professional businesses. 7
Today courts do not award alimony often. While alimony was
not always awarded in the past, the typical recipient was an upper-
middle-class spouse.'" At present, when alimony is awarded, the
award tends to be for a relatively short period of time (one to five
years, for example), for the rehabilitation of the ex-spouse.
Although courts are attempting to recognize the serial reality of
modern marriage and the contributions of an unpaid spouse, I be-
lieve that the law is still deficient in this area. The legal system fails
to note that people make decisions in an intact marriage about
14. See generally HOMER CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 15.3 (2d ed. 1988) (discuss-
ing equitable distribution approach); IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 224-53 (2d ed.
1991) (addressing modern methods of property division).
15. See Alan L. Otten, People Patterns: Marriages that Fail Do So Early On, WALL ST.
J., June 23, 1989, § 2, at 1 (providing divorce statistics). According to this report, 33% of
marriages end within the first four years and 27% within the next five years. Id.
16. See HOMER CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 15.6 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing pen-
sions as marital property). The California Supreme Court found an attorney liable for
malpractice when he failed to include a wife's community interest in her husband's pension
during her divorce action. Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 594 (Cal. 1975).
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (deciding issue of
professional degree as marital property); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1983) (discuss-
ing divisibility of goodwill); Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1042-43 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989) (noting divisibility issues regarding celebrity goodwill); O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 714 (N.Y. 1985) (addressing divisibility of professional degree).
18. See James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Di-
vorce for Women, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 368 (1987) (discussing typical alimony recipient).
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work, children, lifestyle, and education that they would probably
not make if they knew that divorce was in their future. The brunt
of this failure to look out for possible divorce still tends to fall on
the female spouse.
B. Uniform Laws and Federal Statutes
The second major existing trend in family law is the consistency
of family law rules in the states. The widespread adoption of cer-
tain uniform acts and the requirements of federal legislation have
made family law statutes more standardized than in the past. An-
other part of the trend toward uniformity is the extensive body of
case law involving family issues as affected by the United States
Constitution. This latter trend will be discussed in the next section.
Several uniform acts affecting family law have been promul-
gated, with varying impacts, in the last twenty-five years. The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), for example, was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1970, but was adopted by only eight states be-
tween 1971 and 1977.19 However, the provisions of the UMDA
have been influential in the development of marriage and divorce
laws in other states. The Uniform Marital Property Act was
promulgated in 1983, but adopted only in Wisconsin.2 ° This Act
takes a community property approach to property division at di-
vorce, even in a common-law state. The Uniform Parentage Act
was approved in 1973 and adopted by eighteen states.21 This Act
deals with the issue of illegitimate children, and attempts to pro-
vide substantive legal equality for nonmarital children. The Uni-
form Act on Paternity, dealing with procedures to establish
paternity and obligations of nonmarital fathers to support their
children, was approved in 1960 and adopted in six states.22 The
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act was approved in 1983 and has
been adopted in eighteen states.23
The two most significant uniform acts in family law concern cus-
tody and child support. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
19. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. 17 (1987).
20. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. Acr, 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987).
21. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987).
22. UNIF. AcT ON PATERNITY, 9B U.L.A. 347 (1987).
23. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEmENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 38 (1993 Supp.).
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Act and the (Revised) Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act have been adopted in some form in all fifty states. The
federal legislation affecting family law has also focused on these
two areas.
1. Child Custody
As an aside about custody uniformity, virtually all states have
the same standard for making the initial custody determination:
the best interest of the child.24 This basic standard has been in
place since the mid-twentieth century. No uniform act or federal
legislation has affected this basic custody standard. However, how
courts apply the standard has changed in the past twenty-five years.
In the past, courts would apply the "tender years" doctrine, which
would award custody of young children to the female parent, if
possible.25 Courts varied widely in their interpretation of how long
children were in their tender years. Courts and legislatures have
abandoned the tender years doctrine and now tend to use a list of
factors, balancing one parent against the other.
One of the most significant changes in the initial custody deter-
mination is the trend toward joint custody.26 More than thirty
states have some sort of joint custody provision in their custody
statutes. In several states joint custody is the presumed custody
arrangement. For example, joint custody may mean true joint
parenting in the physical and legal sense, or it may simply mean
joint parental decision making on the big issues (joint legal cus-
tody), without joint physical custody. The movement toward joint
custody began in the mid-1970s and continues to the present day.
The arguments in favor of joint custody are somewhat easy to see:
continued contact with both parents for the child and less pressure
on each parent individually. Some authors have criticized the joint
custody standard for failing to give appropriate weight to the role
24. See HOMER CLARK, DomSTic RELATIONS § 19.4 (2d ed. 1988) (addressing stan-
dard for custody decisions).
25. HOMER CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS § 17.4(a) (1968). Homer Clark's
1968 hornbook seems to indicate that the presumption was alive and well at that time. Id.
26. See generally HOMER CLARK, DOMESTiC RELATIONS § 19.5 (2d ed. 1988) (discuss-
ing custody options); Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Foster, Family Law in the 50 States, 22
FAM. L.Q. 367 (1989) (noting trend toward joint custody).
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of the primary caretaker of the children during the marriage.27
They argue that the fear of a joint custody arrangement leads wo-
men to trade property and support for sole custody of their chil-
dren when negotiating their divorce settlement. Other
commentators contend that joint custody may not provide neces-
sary stability for children. They urge the adoption of a primary-
caretaker standard, which would be gender-neutral, but which
would maintain the child-care patterns that were established dur-
ing the marriage.28
The federal law and the uniform act concerning custody deal
largely with postdivorce disputes about custody. Many cases of pa-
rental abductions of children have arisen and continue to arise.
Until fairly recently, parents could kidnap their own children if
they received an unfavorable custody ruling, take the children to
another state, and receive a conflicting, but legal, custody determi-
nation in the other state. Congress enacted the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act (PKPA) in 1980,29 and the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968.30
These two acts attempt to deal with jurisdictional issues involved in
child custody. Each act establishes bases for jurisdiction for a court
to render a verdict on custody other than the mere physical pres-
ence of the child. Each act also lists four bases for state jurisdic-
tion: (1) the state has been the home state of the child within the
last six months; (2) no other state has jurisdiction and the state has
a significant connection with the child and at least one of the par-
27. E.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (2d
ed. 1979); LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 246-53 (1985); Joanne Schul-
man & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and
its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 538, 543 (1982);
Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 460
(1984); Janna B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REV. 497 (1988).
28. E.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 482 (1984); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Profes-
sional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV.
727, 734 (1988); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for Primary Care-
taker as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 490 (1987); see Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,
362-63 (W. Va. 1981) (upholding custody provision favoring primary-caretaker parent).
29. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat.
3568-3573 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)).
30. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 15 (1993 Supp.).
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ties and the issues involved in the custody decision; (3) the child is
physically present in the state and has either been abandoned or an
emergency situation exists; and (4) if no other state has jurisdiction
or another state has deferred, the state may decide the custody is-
sue if it is in the best interest of the child.31 The PKPA and the
UCCJA have some significant differences, although much of the
language is the same. The effectiveness of the statutes is subject to
question because of some loopholes or ambiguities in the laws.32
In the future, the states and the federal government may be able to
devise ways to avoid some of the difficulties. However, predivorce,
prefiling "kidnapping" continues to be a problem.
2. Child Support
The federal government began to involve itself in child support
enforcement in 1974, when Congress enacted Title IV-D of the So-
cial Security Act. 33 Title IV-D was an attempt to reduce the drain
on the funds for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). Title IV-D's provisions required states to set up pro-
grams using existing state laws to establish paternity, secure child
support awards, and enforce those awards in a timely manner.
While this program was helpful, it became clear by the early 1980s
that there was cause for alarm about the general level of child sup-
port in the United States, in addition to concerns about AFDC.
Between 1984 and 1986, only about sixty percent of custodial par-
ents even had a child support order. Of those parents with an or-
der, only about fifty percent received all or virtually all of the
support required to be paid.34
31. The Texas version of the UCCJA is found in the Family Code at §§ 11.51-.75.
32. Many authors have questioned the usefulness of PKPA & the UCCJA. E.g., Bar-
bara H. Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 369, 371
(1991); Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY
L.J. 291, 300 (1986); Brigette Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and
Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203, 211 (1981); Andrea S. Char-
low, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 299, 308 (1991); Russel M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recogni-
tion and Enforcement, 66 MINN L. REv. 711, 717 (1982).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2351 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 657-665
(1988)).
34. See IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 402-404 (2d ed. 1991) (noting child
support statistics).
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Congress thus enacted the Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984. 35 These amendments are far more comprehensive
than the earlier law and require the states to implement a number
of practices and procedures in order to improve the level and the
regularity of child support payments. The most significant provi-
sions are: (1) states must formulate discretionary guidelines for
courts to use in establishing levels of child support; (2) states must
provide for mandatory wage withholding for child support; (3) the
statute of limitations for the establishment of paternity cannot be
less than eighteen years after the child is born; (4) state and federal
income tax refunds can be used to offset delinquent child support
payments; (5) liens may be filed against property owned by delin-
quent obligors; and (6) support arrearages must be reported to
consumer credit reporting companies.
Congress followed up in 1988 with the Family Support Act.36
This law focuses on the modification of support awards and obli-
gates the state agencies responsible for enforcing child support or-
ders to engage in periodic review of those orders and to pursue the
adjustment of support orders if they are not in compliance with the
state law. Also, the 1988 act reinforces the 1984 amendments by
requiring wage withholding to occur immediately at the time the
child support order is entered (not just after a delinquency occurs)
and by mandating that the statutory child support guidelines be
presumptive, rather than discretionary.
The original Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA) was approved by the Commissioners in 1950 and was
adopted in several states. Thirteen states still maintain this ver-
sion.37 A Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (RURESA) was adopted in 1968, and this version is in effect
in the other thirty-seven states.38 The statute only attempts to im-
prove interstate enforcement efforts and does not directly affect
original child support awards. Basically, the law provides three
means of securing interstate enforcement of child support orders.
35. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667
(1988)).
36. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 100 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667
(1988)).
37. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 100 (1993 Supp.).
38. (REVISED) UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 58
(1993 Supp.).
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First, a registration provision is available if an order is already in
effect. The obligee can register the order in the state where the
obligor resides, and the prosecuting attorney will pursue enforce-
ment in that state. 39 A petitioning process is another means of en-
forcement, and this method may proceed with or without an
existing order. The process begins in the state where the obligee
resides and then moves to the state where the obligor resides.
Again, the prosecuting attorney follows up in the obligor's state,
but the choice-of-law rule applied is the law of the state where the
obligor lived when the obligation was incurred.4° Finally,
RURESA provides for extradition when criminal prosecution is
sought, although this option is not often used.4'
Even though universally adopted (in either the original or re-
vised versions), (R)URESA has not been so effective as hoped.
Delinquent child support is a widespread problem, and the state
offices charged with enforcement are frequently unable to keep up
with the demand. Increased staffing and streamlined procedures
may improve collection efforts in the future.
C. The Constitution and Family Law
The United States Supreme Court has decided several cases in
the past twenty-five years that have profoundly altered many of the
legal rules affecting the family. A brief overview follows.
1. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
In 1967, the Court held in Loving v. Virginia42 that Virginia's
antimiscegenation law was unconstitutional because it violated
both due process and equal protection requirements.43 Loving was
pivotal in establishing marriage as a fundamental right. In a similar
vein, the Court later found that to deny individuals access to the
courts for the purpose of obtaining a divorce simply because they
could not afford the court fees was a violation of due process. 44 In
39. Id. at §§ 35-40.
40. Id. at §§ 7-34.
41. Id. at §§ 5-6.
42. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The statute prohibited persons of different races from
marrying. Id. at 2.
44. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) (discussing denial of due pro-
cess rights).
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1978, the Court struck down a Wisconsin law that made getting
married difficult for persons who were delinquent in their court-
ordered child support payments.45 The statute prohibited parents
from marrying without court permission if they were subject to a
court order to pay child support and did not have custody of the
child.46 The purpose of the statute was to alleviate the welfare bur-
den and to increase payment of child support.4 7 In order to get
permission, however, the parent had to show that the child support
was paid up and that the children were not likely to become public
charges.4 The Court reiterated that marriage was a fundamental
right and held that this type of restriction was overly burden-
some.49 Finally, in 1987, the Court held that a Missouri law prohib-
iting prisoners from marrying without the permission of the
superintendent was unconstitutional.5 The law in issue provided
that permission would be granted only under compelling circum-
stances; in fact, the only compelling circumstances were a preg-
nancy or a nonmarital birth.5 The Court found that, although
prisoners could be subject to more stringent regulations, the funda-
mental right to marry could not be restricted in this way.
2. Privacy
The Court began the line of cases protecting a right of privacy in
1965. In Griswold v. Connecticut,52 the Court held that a state law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons violated
due process.5 3 This decision was crucial in establishing the concept
of a right of sexual privacy that would be expanded in later cases.
In 1971, the Court struck down a statute that prohibited distribu-
tion of contraceptives to unmarried persons.5 4 The law in issue vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, according to
the majority opinion of the Court, because no meaningful way to
distinguish between married and unmarried persons for the use of
45. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 377 (1978).
46. Id. at 375.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
50. Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 78-79 (1987).
51. Id. at 79.
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. Id. at 485-86.
54. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
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contraceptives existed.5 5 Later, the Court held that a law permit-
ting only pharmacists to sell nonprescription contraceptive devices
to persons over the age of sixteen, and prohibiting the sale of such
contraceptives to those under sixteen, was unconstitutional. 6 The
restriction on adults was simply too burdensome,"' in the majority
view.
An important limit on sexual privacy as a constitutional matter
was established by the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick5 1 decided in
1986. The Bowers majority upheld a state criminal statute prohibit-
ing homosexual sodomy, even for consenting adults performing the
activity in private.59 The majority found that the concept of sexual
privacy was limited to conduct grounded in United States history
and traditions.60 Homosexual activity was not included as a funda-
mental right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," or suffi-
ciently established in the national culture.6 The decision in
Bowers leaves the legal limits of private consensual sexual activity
unclear, particularly in regard to heterosexual couples. For exam-
ple, may the government ban adult heterosexual couples from en-
gaging in consensual private sodomy?
Another aspect of the right of privacy is explored in the series of
abortion cases beginning with Roe v. Wade62 in 1973. In Roe, the
Court overturned a Texas criminal statute forbidding abortion of a
fetus except to save the life of the mother.63 The Court has decided
many cases on the issue of abortion in the aftermath of Roe.'
55. See id. at 438-39 (discussing Court's rationale).
56. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 680 (1977).
57. See id. (criticizing restriction).
58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
59. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
60. See id. at 191-94 (discussing majority's limitations on sexual privacy).
61. See id. at 194 (noting Court's opinion on role of homosexuality in American
culture).
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166-67.
64. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 492 U.S. 917 (1990) (addressing parental notifica-
tion issues); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (concerning via-
bility issues); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (pondering
hospitalization requirement for women obtaining abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980) (discussing Medicaid funding of abortion issues); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379 (1979) (deciding viability issues); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (addressing Medi-
caid funding of abortion); Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (identifying parental-con-
sent issues); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (describing spousal-
consent issues).
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Much has been written about the legal, moral, and political issues
that the case raises.65 To date, the Court has not overruled Roe,
although some limitations have been placed on the right to abor-
tion, over and above those restrictions first outlined by Justice
Blackmun in the original opinion. The Roe case and the Court de-
cisions discussed below are certainly significant for family law, be-
cause they help to define the parameters of some fundamental
issues involving conflicts between parent and child, husband and
wife, the individual and the family, and the individual and society,
as well as help to define the role of welfare benefits in familial
decision making.
3. Termination of Parental Rights
The Supreme Court has not done much in the area of termina-
tion of parental rights in the past twenty-five years, yet one of the
most ideologically significant family law cases in recent history is a
termination case. In Santosky v. Kramer,66 the Court held that the
constitutionally mandated minimum standard for the termination
of parental rights is clear and convincing evidence. 67 Thus, a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard is insufficient to protect the
familial rights of the parents. The majority indicated that clear and
convincing evidence was the proper standard to be used when both
the state and the individual interests at stake were significant.68
The Court reasoned that a termination proceeding was similar to a
civil commitment or a deportation hearing. This decision is philo-
sophically significant because it means that the Constitution re-
quires error in favor of protection of parental rights. The Court's
65. E.g., ABORTION, MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia
Hennessey eds. 1984); MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
(1987); STEPHEN M. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF Roe v. Wade AND Doe v. Bolton AND A BASIS FOR CHANGE (1984);
THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: PRo-LIFE VS. PRO-CHOICE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Ro-
senbaum eds. 1989); THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ABORTION (Carl E. Schneider & Maris A.
Vinovskis eds. 1980); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990);
PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION RIGrS As RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1992); Albert M. Pearson
& Paul M. Kurtz, The Abortion Controversy: A Study in Law and Politics, 8 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 427 (1985).
66. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
67. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747.
68. See id. at 748 (discussing when clear and convincing evidence standard is
appropriate).
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decision indicates that we should err on the side of failure to termi-
nate, even if circumstances warrant, rather than err on the side of
an improper termination. The implications of this holding are par-
ticularly important in evaluating potential legal conflicts between
parents and their children.
TWo other questions with constitutional implications have arisen
in the termination context. One is the question of due process.
Some parties have challenged termination statutes by arguing that
the standards are vague, or do not require fault or voluntary con-
duct on the part of a parent. The Court has not addressed this
issue.69 The other question concerns the right to counsel in a ter-
mination proceeding. In 1981, the Court considered, but did not
definitively resolve, this question.70 The majority, by a five-to-four
margin, left the decision regarding what due process requires under
any particular circumstance to the state courts.7' As a result, the
majority of states do require appointed counsel, either by statute or
by case law.
4. Paternity
Paternity law, both generally and in the constitutional setting, is
in the process of evolution. Not long ago, the (all but irrebuttable)
presumption was that a woman's husband was the father of her
child.72 Only if she were unmarried would the issue of paternity
come into play. The Supreme Court has visited the issue of the
unwed father's rights five times since 1973, leaving a somewhat
confusing array of cases in its wake.
69. See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (illustrating
that court declines to address issue of voluntary parental conduct). The key issue in these
cases is the level of appropriate state intervention. A strong noninterventionist position is
taken by some commentators. E.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). A more pro-interventionist approach is taken by other writers.
E.g., Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 894 (1975); Marsha Garrison,
Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J.
1745, 1749 (1987).
70. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20 (1981) (addressing
right-to-counsel issue).
71. Id. at 20.
72. See HOMER CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 156 (1968) (discussing pater-
nity presumption). This presumption was known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, originating in
dictum in Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777).
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The odyssey began in 1972, with Stanley v. Illinois.73 Stanley was
actually a termination case, and the Court held that a father could
not be presumed to be unfit merely because he was not married to
the mother of his children.74 In this case, the father had a strong,
long-term relationship with the children.7 Six years later, the
Court held that a father who had not formed any sort of relation-
ship with his child had no right to veto an adoption of the child by
the mother's new husband.76 However, in the same year, the Court
held that unmarried mothers could not be preferred to unmarried
fathers in termination or adoption situations. In Caban v. Moham-
med,77 a New York statute permitted children to be adopted by a
mother's husband without a father's consent, but it prohibited chil-
dren from being adopted by a father's wife without a mother's con-
sent.78 In other words, a father's rights could be terminated and his
children adopted by someone else, even over his objection, but a
mother's rights could not be so terminated. The Court found that
the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.79 In 1983, in Lehr
v. Robertson,8 ° the Court added to the confusion. Lehr established
the proposition that an unwed father who neither maintained an
active relationship with his child nor took advantage of the statu-
tory opportunities to be recognized as the legal father was not enti-
tled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at the adoption
hearing in which the mother's husband petitioned to adopt the
child.8'
Most recently, the Court has, in a way, come full circle on the
issue of the rights of the unwed father. Michael H. v. Gerald D.82
presented an interesting fact situation. The mother of the child was
an international model.8 3 She had an affair with Michael H., who
was the probable natural father,84 but she was married to Gerald
73. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
74. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.
75. Id. at 649.
76. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978).
77. 441 U.S. 380 (1978).
78. Caban, 441 U.S. at 384.
79. See id. (discussing statute's constitutional violation).
80. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
81. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249.
82. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
83. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
84. Id. at 114.
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D. at all times.8 5 The child, Victoria, lived with each of the three
adults at various times during her first three years of life, and
Michael did establish a relationship with her. 6 A California stat-
ute, which has since been changed, created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the husband of the mother was the father of the
child.81 At some point, the mother and her husband decided that
they wanted to exclude Michael from the family relationship.88
Michael sued, arguing that the statute violated both his and his
child's due process and equal protection rights.8 9 The case gener-
ated five opinions' and created significant controversy. Five jus-
tices actually did find that the natural father possessed rights that
were entitled to constitutional protection.91 The plurality opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, relied on notions of the traditional family
and family privacy to reject the natural father's claims.92 Justice
Stevens cast the deciding vote. He agreed with the reasoning of
the dissenters, noting that the biological father was entitled to con-
stitutional protection of his rights.93 Justice Stevens found, how-
ever, that the California law in question did give the father
adequate opportunity to assert his claims.94
All of these cases leave the rights of the nonmarital father in an
uncertain state. Unwed fathers can take steps to protect their
rights, if they choose to do so. They can establish a relationship
with the child and can take advantage of all legal opportunities to
85. Id. at 114-15.
86. Id. at 114.
87. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115.
88. Id. at 115-16.
89. Id. at 110.
90. See id. at 110, 132, 136, 157 (including opinions by Justices Brennan, White, Ste-
vens, O'Connor, and Scalia). Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 113-32. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy agreed with Scalia, ex-
cept for a footnote in Scalia's opinion about historical analysis. Id. at 132. Justice Stevens
concurred. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented. Id.
at 136. Justice White dissented separately, joined by Brennan. Id. at 157.
91. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128-30 (stating possible constitutional protection of
relationship between parent and child).
92. See id. at 124 (rejecting traditional protection of relationship between biological
father and child).
93. See id. at 132 (concurring in judgment with plurality of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy).
94. See Michael Oddenino, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly: A Critical Analysis of
the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 25 FAM. L.Q. 125, 131 (1991)
(recognizing adequate redress for biological father).
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be recognized as the father. On the other hand, at least some
members of the Court would permit a state to cut back significantly
the putative father's rights in the interest of traditional marital har-
mony and family values. The majority of the Court did, however,
recognize the significant interests at stake in cases like Michael H.
I expect the Court will continue to be asked to consider questions
involving the rights of the unwed father until some legal clarity be-
gins to emerge.
The Court has considered two other constitutional issues involv-
ing paternity. In 1981, the Court found that denying the right to
blood tests to a putative father because he was indigent and could
not afford the tests was a violation of due process.95 The right to
the blood tests was essential to protect the father's due process
rights. In 1987, the Court held that due process was satisfied when
paternity was proved by a preponderance of the evidence
standard.96
5. Gender
The Court has decided a few family law cases involving gender
questions. As a matter of constitutional law, gender questions in-
volving equal protection and due process are evaluated under an
"intermediate" level of inquiry. 97 A law that treats men and wo-
men differently must serve important governmental objectives and
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
The paternity cases discussed in the previous section raise some
gender issues. In those cases, the Court seemed to indicate that
there may be some reasons to treat unmarried mothers differently
from unmarried fathers with regard to custody and termination of
parental rights. These reasons must be carefully considered and
justified in a logical way.
In regard to spousal and child support, the Court has failed to
find the significant state interest in treating males and females dif-
ferently. In Stanton v. Stanton,98 the Court struck down a statute
95. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (mandating blood tests for indigent
parents).
96. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 581 (1987) (noting similarities between inter-
est in paternity proceedings and interest in private ligation giving rise to standard of
proof).
97. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 203 (1976).
98. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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that established a lower age of majority for women than for men.99
The effect of this provision was to stop payment of child support at
an earlier age for female children.10° The Court found that the as-
serted state justification was inadequate to support the law.' 0' The
state had argued that women were naturally suited to adult roles as
housewives and mothers and would be able to fulfill these roles at
an earlier age than their male counterparts. 10 2 In a similar vein, the
Court struck down Alabama statutes that permitted courts to re-
quire husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony at divorce. 3 The
Court criticized the asserted state justifications that the statute re-
flected the state's preference that women be kept in a subservient
role; that the statute served the goal of protecting needy spouses,
and used sex as a proxy for need; and that the statute was an at-
tempt to remedy past economic discrimination against women.) 4
In its opinion the Court indicated that, while the second and third
reasons might be laudable, this statutory scheme did not advance
the goals sought to be achieved. 0 5 Sex was not a reliable proxy for
need, and, because a full hearing was available in any event, such a
proxy was unnecessary. The use of alimony as a compensation for
past discrimination could actually work to keep women in a sub-
servient role and in a disadvantaged position, according to Justice
Brennan's 1979 majority opinion.' 6
Recently, the Court has agreed to hear a gender-based discrimi-
nation case that also involves a paternity issue. In J.E.B. v. T.B.,107
the issue is whether a male defendant in a paternity action brought
by the state may use the Equal Protection Clause to protest the
state's use of peremptory challenges to strike all males from the
jury. The claim is based in part on the 1986 case of Batson v. Ken-
99. See Stanton, 421 U.S. at 17-18 (noting that statute denies equal protection of laws
as guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment).
100. See id. at 9 (citing statute that allows support payments to be terminated when
child reaches age of majority, i.e., 18 years for females and 21 years for males).
101. See id. at 14-15 (recognizing that children, regardless of gender, must be equally
protected).
102. See Stanton, 421 U.S. at 15 (rejecting state's assertion that females mature earlier
than males and that males need longer educational period to become providers).
103. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979).
104. See id. at 281 (realizing that statute actually produces adverse results).
105. See id. at 282 (demonstrating that statute, in fact, only benefits financially secure
wives whose husbands are in need).
106. See id. at 283 (noting that gender-based statutes must be carefully tailored).
107. 61 U.S.L.W. 3759 (1993).
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:405
tucky, 10 8 in which the Court held that the state may not use per-
emptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of race.' °9
6. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is the final area in which the Court has had signifi-
cant impact on family law, using the Constitution as a basis for its
decisions. In 1968, the Court decided the first of a series of cases
that eventually would lead to a complete changeover in the way
illegitimate children are treated under the law. In Levy v. Louisi-
ana,110 the Court held that illegitimate children could not be dis-
criminated against with regard to their mothers."' The Levy case
declared that a wrongful death statute could not deny recovery to
illegitimate children for the death of their mothers, when legiti-
mate children were permitted to recover." 2 During the 1970s the
Court adopted an intermediate standard of review for equal pro-
tection claims based on the classification of legitimacy." 3 The
cases in this series dealt with discrimination against illegitimate
children in such areas as worker's compensation benefits," 4 child
support," 5 welfare," 6 and social security benefits." 7 By 1977, the
Court also had held that illegitimate children could not be discrimi-
108. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
109. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (requiring race equality in jury selection process).
110. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
111. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (noting that illegitimacy has no relation to parental apti-
tude); see also Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968)
(striking state statute barring recovery for damages to parent of illegitimate child).
112. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
113. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1979) (noting possible constitutional
violation when legislation creates classes based upon immutable human attributes); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (requiring that illegitimacy classification be "substantially
related to permissible state interest"). However, it is arguable that the Court did not clar-
ify the standard until the decision in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983). See JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 14 (1986) (emphasizing judicial incongruency).
114. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 167 (1972) (upholding
statute that allows only legitimate and acknowledged illegitimate children to recover
worker's compensation benefits).
115. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 535 (1973) (overruling discriminatory common
law).
116. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 619 (1973) (striking
statutory program because of equal protection violation).
117. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974) (striking provision of social
security law denying disability benefits to nonmarital children unless certain conditions are
met).
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nated against with regard to their fathers. In Trimble v. Gordon,"8
the Court established that illegitimate children could not be denied
the right to inherit from their fathers when legitimate children
would be allowed to inherit.1" 9
III. CHANGES IN THE FUTURE
A. Expand the Definition of Family
One of the foreseeable trends in family law is the movement to
expand the legal definition of family. If asked to define a family,
many people will pick* a "realistic" definition, such as "a group of
people who love and care for each other," rather than a legalistic
definition, such as "a group of people, living in the same house-
hold, who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption.' 20
Several years ago, the California Supreme Court recognized a
potential claim to property and support for an unmarried cohabi-
tant on the basis of both contract and equitable claims in the well-
known case, Marvin v. Marvin.121 In Marvin, the parties were not
married, but had established a marriage-like relationship. 22 Many
courts, however, have declined to follow the California court's lead
in the Marvin case. 23
At approximately the same time as the Marvin case, the United
States Supreme Court held that an East Cleveland housing ordi-
nance defined "family" too narrowly and therefore violated the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.124 The zoning ordinance
prohibited a grandmother from living in an apartment with her son
and two grandchildren, because the grandchildren were cousins,
not siblings.125 The Court, however, had previously upheld a zon-
118. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
119. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776 (noting violation of Equal Protection Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).
120. Juan Seligman, Variations on a Theme, NEWSWEEK, Winter/Spring 1990, at 38,38.
121. 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976).
122. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 109-10.
123. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979) (noting contraven-
tion of public policy as basis for refusing to recognize certain contractual rights of unmar-
ried); see also Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Property Rights Arising from Relationship of
Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3 A.L.R. 4th 13, 43-44 (1979) (discussing case history
of unmarried cohabitants).
124. See Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (illustrating over-
reach of ordinance).
125. See id. at 496-97 (stressing restrictive scope of ordinance).
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ing ordinance that prohibited more than two unmarried persons
who were not otherwise related from living together in the same
dwelling. 126
Many municipalities have enacted domestic-partners laws, which
permit unmarried cohabitants, usually regardless of sexual prefer-
ence, to register their relationship, thereby rendering the relation-
ship legal under local law. 2 7 Some state courts have recognized
nontraditional relationships, as did the New York Court of Appeals
in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.a2 8 In Braschi, the court permitted
recognition of the surviving partner of a homosexual couple as a
family member for purposes of the New York rent-control ordi-
nance.'2 9 In a recent, truly ground-breaking case, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the Hawaii marriage statute may violate
the Hawaii Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, because the
statute does not permit marriages between persons of the same
sex.'
30
I think the law will begin to recognize, perhaps reluctantly, alter-
native forms of family relationships. What many people think of as
the traditional, nuclear, 1950s-style family does not fit the majority
of households in the United States today. In fact, that model may
be an aberration in the larger historical context of the American
family experience.' 3' Recent statistics show that approximately 25
percent of all first births in the United States today are to unmar-
ried mothers, and the number approaches 50 percent for African-
American women. 32 What we think of as a "traditional" family-
husband and wife, living together with children-is a minority fam-
ily structure today.
126. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
127. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing domes-
tic-partners law).
128. See id. at 55 (discussing the nontraditional same-sex relationship). Denmark's
and Sweden's statutory recognition of nonmarital relationships extends to same-sex
couples. See IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 871 (2d ed. 1991) (explaining nature of
foreign statutes recognizing expanded familial relationships).
129. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55.
130. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (indicating possible marital
rights for homosexuals).
131. See generally ARLENE SKOLNICK, EMBATrLED PARADISE (1991) (tracing chang-
ing role of traditional family).
132. Study Finds Increasing Rate of Out-of-Wedlock Children, SAN ANoNIO ExPREss
NEWS, Dec. 4, 1991, at B5.
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B. Autonomy of Children-Conflict of Parental and Children's
Rights
The second major development in the future of family law is
likely to be the increased assertion of rights of children when a real
or potential conflict with parental rights exists. This situation can
arise in two contexts: the case of a child in an existing family rela-
tionship, and the case of a yet-to-be-born child.
In the existing family, several cases in recent years suggest some
of the potential conflicts for the future. For example, a recent case
permitted a preteen boy to terminate his mother's parental rights,
over her objections, on his own behalf.133 This action paved the
way for his adoption by another family.
Furthermore, there are some advocates for stricter or different
divorce laws for families with children. Parents would not be per-
mitted to divorce under these schemes unless the divorce could be
shown to be in the best interest of the children, as well as the wish
of the parents.3 Similarly, children could routinely be granted
representation in divorce cases where custody is in dispute. Or,
children could have the right to enforce visitation from their non-
custodial parent. If Dad or Mom did not exercise the right to visi-
tation, the child would have the standing and the legal right to ask
the court to order the parent to do so.
There are also many recent cases pitting the rights of biological
parents against the rights of adoptive or foster parents. (This gen-
eral subject was discussed in the section on paternity, above.)
However, I think that the law will continue to struggle with the
legal importance of the biological tie. The media have devoted
much attention in recent months to several cases involving conflicts
between foster or adoptive parents and biological parents. Chil-
dren are placed with foster parents or with couples who hope to
adopt, and may be left in that family situation for months or years.
The original placement might be owing to abuse or neglect in the
home, or might be the result of a mistake. Very young children will
133. In re Gregory K. (Rachael Kingsley v. Gregory Kingsley), Nos. 92-2430, 92-2446,
1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8645, at *1, *29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134. See, e.g., MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 92-
111 (1987) (asserting that child's interest must be considered in divorce cases); Judith T.
Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L. REV.
891, 903 (1992) (recommending strict divorce requirements).
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bond quickly with their caretakers. Later, the biological parents
may seek the return of their children. While the traditional legal
view tends to uphold the rights of the biological family, particularly
parents, the child's psychological and emotional well-being may
best be served by a type of balancing or some other test.
Finally, the rights of the yet-to-be-born child have been litigated
frequently in recent years.135 Of course, many cases on the right to
an abortion exist, and the Court will continue to work with its deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade, although it remains to be seen whether Roe
will be overturned. Even outside the abortion context, the law has
often been presented with significant questions involving conflicts
between maternal and fetal rights. The problem of cocaine-ad-
dicted infants has led some prosecutors to use the criminal law in
an attempt to charge mothers with delivery of a controlled sub-
stance to their unborn children. While somewhat successful at the
trial court level, these efforts often have not been upheld on ap-
peal. 36 The question, however, remains open: How should society
balance the maternal rights against those of the fetus, assuming
that the mother will not choose the option of abortion? Issues
have been raised about prenatal use of alcohol and prescription
drugs, and even about proper prenatal eating habits. Some courts
have ordered defendants to have the new, surgically implanted
Norplant contraceptive inserted, in an effort to stop women who
135. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 421-37 (1991) (commenting on rights
guaranteed to unborn children).
136. See, e.g., In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1992) (overturning termina-
tion of parental rights of mother who abused cocaine prior to birth); Johnson v. State, 602
So. 2d 1288, 1296-97 (Fla. 1992) (holding that cocaine which passed through umbilical cord
after birth of child was not delivery of controlled substance to minor); People v. Hardy, 469
N.W.2d 50, 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that legislature did not intend that delivery
of cocaine statute apply to transfer of drug from mother to child through post-partum
umbilical cord). Efforts to incorporate prenatal abuse into civil child-abuse law have been
more successful. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 415.503 (9)(a) (West Supp. 1990);
In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio P. 1986); Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Sub-
stance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209
(1987); Dawn Johnson, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Wo-
men's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1989); Kary Moss, Substance Abuse
During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278 (1990); Tom Rickhoff & Curtis L. Cukjati,
Protecting the Fetus from Maternal Drug and Alcohol Abuse: A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 259 (1989).
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are substance abusers from continuing to give birth to children who
are drug-addicted, or who are later neglected or abused. 37
Several cases deal with the issue of forced Caesarean sections,
performed over the objection of the mother, or of the husband or
other relative of the mother. Sometimes the issue in the case is the
mother's religious objection to blood transfusions, or simply her
questioning the necessity of the surgery in general.138  In other
cases, the mother may be unconscious because of accident or ill-
ness, and the issue is whether to attempt to save the baby even if an
operation presents medical risks to the mother. 39
Particularly in light of constitutionally based privacy precedents
in this area, these questions are among the most fundamental and
profound issues that we face in family law. These situations di-
rectly pit the rights of the not-yet-living against those of the living:
the hope and the freedoms of those existing in the present against
those to-be-existing in the future.
C. Reproductive Technology
If the biological and privacy issues raised above are among the
most profound, the reproductive technology issues are certainly
among the most interesting in family law.' 40 The "abortion pill,"
137. See Stacy D. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control,
or Crime Control?, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 15 (1992) (discussing case in which defendant
was ordered to use Norplant).
138. See Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 9-10 (1987) (addressing case involving court-ordered
Caesarean-section delivery); Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose
Decision Is It Anyway?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 591, 595 (1989) (discussing forced Caesarean-
section delivery); Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 599
(1986) (noting court-ordered surgery); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory
and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (1990) (explaining forced
Caesarean-section deliveries); see also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 80 (N.Y. 1990)
(confronting issue of blood-transfusion objections).
139. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. App. 1990) (discussing issue of
surgery on terminally ill mother); see also Sam Seibert, A Matter of Life and Death, NEWS-
WEEK, Nov. 16, 1992, at 55 (illustrating delicacy of decision). German doctors kept a brain-
dead 18-year-old woman who was 14 weeks pregnant on life support for several weeks in
the hope of saving the child. Id.
140. See generally Kathryn Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory
for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1984) (discussing reproductive alternatives);
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939,942 (1986) (addressing reproductive technology
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R-U 486, makes nonsurgical, private, and early abortion avail-
able.' 41 Additionally, the ability of the medical establishment to
separate the act of sex from the fact of procreation has fascinating
possibilities for family law. Artificial insemination has made it pos-
sible to enter into surrogacy contracts, in which one woman will
carry the child of another individual or couple, either with the sur-
rogate's own fertilized egg, or the other woman's fertilized egg. It
is possible for a grandmother to carry her grandchild through a
pregnancy, or for an aunt to carry her niece. A lesbian couple may
have one partner impregnated with the fertilized egg of the other
partner. Fertilized eggs may be preserved for several years, and
genetic siblings may be implanted at different times, or in different
women. All of these procedures are already possible, although
they are not always successfully performed. Additionally, sex-
change operations make transsexual marriages possible.'42 The
family law implications are already enormous. Who is the mother,
the father, or the child in each of these situations? What are the
legal relationships between these people, and what are their conse-
quent legal obligations and benefits? The future may bring other,
even more mind-bending, possibilities, with genetic transforma-
tions, babies made-to-order, or mind- and memory-altering
technologies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Family law is one of my favorite subjects for both teaching and
research purposes as a law professor. Family law is universal be-
cause it affects everyone. It is vibrant in that it changes to reflect
and to shape the society of which it is a part. It is unusual because
it touches on many other aspects of law in a way that many other
subjects do not. And it is challenging, because the way that a soci-
and its ramifications); Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 299 (discussing potential effects of emerging technol-
ogy); Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Ar-
tificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295, 300 (1991) (explaining issues related to artificial
insemination).
141. See ETIENNE-EMILE BAULIEU & MORT ROSENBLUM, THE ABORTION PILL 3
(1991) (noting revolutionary method of birth control).
142. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (allowing mar-
riage); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (discussing
issue of transsexual marriage); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 10 (P. Ct. 1987) (prohib-
iting transsexual marriage).
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ety and a legal system treat families says much about both the qual-
ity of the society and of the law. Family law is the vehicle that is
frequently used to grapple with serious, meaningful, and essential
questions about our lives. I hope that we, as lawyers, are able to
assist in the struggle in a way that is thoughtful, wise, and humane.
A careful look at family law-past, present, and future-is one way
to do that.
